“Errare humanum est, perseverare autem diabolicum” —Lucius Annaeus Seneca, 4 bc to 45 ad  by de Leval, Marc R.
Jacques et al Congenital Heart Diseasewere controllable were considered an error. This is in line with the
seminal publication of Leape and colleagues 20 years ago.
Dr Paul Kirshbom (Atlanta, Ga). I was wondering with this very
nongranular presentation if more granular analysis of your data pre-
sented you with any opportunities to take action. Did you identify
acommonality inyour ICUerrors, forexample,drugdelivery ina large
majority that could be affected by a change in your drug-delivery sys-
tem or any other commonality you could change in the future?
Dr Jacques. Yes, we have identified areas to target. That was
the ultimate goal, but I haven’t been able to detail that aspect inCOMMEN
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The Journal of Thoracic and Carthe presentation. In the postoperative period, ‘‘hinge points’’ are
important. We know that in the intensive care and anesthesia lit-
erature, all the transition points, such as transferring, transport-
ing, and extubating the patient, are important periods. In our
study, ‘‘hinge points of importance’’ are timing of delayed chest
closure, timing of extubation, transfer to the ward, and the
period surrounding the discharge of the patient. These are the
most important areas where we will have to focus. We are
now working on establishing guidelines to improve the care at
these points.TARY C
H
D‘‘Errare humanum est, perseverare autem diabolicum’’ —Lucius
Annaeus Seneca, 4 BC to 45 ADMarc R. de Leval, MD, FRCSMedical outcomes result from complex interactions among
3 sets of variables: those related to the diseases, those
related to the treatments, and those related to the care
providers. The majority of outcome researchers have
concentrated on illness-specific or procedural-related
variables. By and large, human factors related to the
performance of care providers have not been included in
those analyses. Yet investment in human factors has been
shown to improve safety and enhance reliability in high-
technology industries in general and aviation in particular.
High-technology medicine such as cardiac surgery shares
many properties with what is often referred to as complex
social technical systems in which performance depends
on complex individual technical and organizational factors
and their interactions.1
In this issue of the Journal, Jacques and colleagues2
investigate the impact of human errors on team performance
and outcomes of staged palliation of hypoplastic left
heart syndromes and physiologic equivalents. Repairs of
hypoplastic left heart syndromes are models of high-technology surgery par excellence. They have a low error
tolerance requiring a sophisticated organizational structure,
the coordinated efforts of multiple individuals working in
teams, and high levels of cognitive and technical performance.
The authors review the course summaries of 191 patients
undergoing operations in a single institution over a 10-year
period. Technical and judgment errors at each stage of the
Norwood strategywere extracted from these summaries. Hu-
man errors affected approximately 50% of the patients at
both stage I and II of the Norwood strategy. At stage I,
most intraoperative judgment errors are not detected at the
time of the operation. Serious technical errors are
recognized and addressed intraoperatively (30% of patients
at stage I underwent a revision of the repair). Those
revisions were not associated with an increased risk of
strategy failure (death or transplantation), but they delayed
the postoperative recovery. Judgment errors led to an
increase in postoperative errors.
Postoperative errors are the strongest and most reliable
determinants of poor outcomes. The predictors of postoper-
ative errors are the complexity of the morphologic substrate
(more complex patients have a higher risk for error in their
management), and errors in intraoperative surgical judg-
ment increase the risk of postoperative errors. The majority
of postoperative errors after stage I are foreseeable.
Intraoperative errors at stage II did not compromise
outcomes, but despite their low incidence the postoperative
errors did have an impact on outcomes.
This study conveys important messages. In the current




Ddefects, such as hypoplastic left heart syndromes, is prone to
errors. Errormanagement should be part of the surgical train-
ing. The aviation industry has introduced Crew Resource
Management training, which is based on anticipation, detec-
tion, and recovery. Previous experience and accurate preop-
erative investigations should help to anticipate errors. The
routine intraoperative echocardiographic control of stage I
repair, which led to a revision in 30% of the patients without
being associated with strategy failure, is a good illustration
of detection and recovery. The surgical team should be men-
tally and technically prepared to take down a complex repair
and to revise it. It is probably the most difficult task for sur-
geons in training to master. It implies resilience and spare
capacity, which can be difficult to acquire. The aviation in-
dustry has again introduced the NOTECHS scoring system
to analyze effective team performance. The nontechnical
skills describe the cognitive or mental skills (decision mak-
ing, planning, and situation awareness) and interpersonal
abilities (teamwork, communication, and leadership). Those
behavioralmarkers are unlikely to be captured in a retrospec-
tive review of clinical summaries. They should be part of
a prospective observational study, ideally undertaken by hu-
man factors experts.Video camera recordings can be a useful
adjunct to the observer’s report. TheNOTECHS scoring sys-
tem, currently operational in the airline industry, has been
proposed as a method to reduce surgical errors.3,4
The interpretation of the strong impact of postoperative
errors on outcomes is complex. The sickest infants and
those who experienced intraoperative errors clearly are at
higher risk of strategy failure. In complex systems, errors
are known to escalate in cascade. Intensive care units are
complex environments prone to NOTECHS errors. It is1476 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surnot infrequent to have leadership issues with gaps between
authority and knowledge. Multiple teams and hierarchies
are involved in the management of the same patients. Those
at the front line may not have the seniority to pick up
trends and insidious changes, which can be premonitory
signs of a more serious deterioration (lack of situation
awareness). Communication issues are of major impor-
tance, with multiple handovers between different teams
and between individuals of the same team. Those handovers
have multiplied in recent years with the regulation of
working hours for the medical profession. The handover
of sick infants after heart surgery from the operating room
to the intensive care unit has been likened to the pit-stop
in Formula I car racing, in which errors are detected by
expert observers and video cameras.5 The authors of this
article wisely highlight the importance of hinge points of
which handovers are only one example. The generalization
of checklists has been a positive step forward to reduce the
error rate in these transitions.6
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